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In the

Supreme Court of the State of Utah
CLAUDE DENNIS,
Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.
THE DENVER AND RIO GRANDE
WESTERN RAILROAD
CO~iP ANY, a corporation,

Case
No. 9543

Defendant arnd Appella.nl.

STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
This is an action under the Federal Employers Liability Act for personal injuries claimed to have been
sustained by the plaintiff \Yhile in the course of his employment with the defendant.

DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The case was tried before a jury. At the close of
plaintiff's evidence the defendant moved the court for a
directed verdict. The court denied defendant's motion
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

2

and submitted the case to the jury. The jury returned a
verdict in favor of plaintiff and against the employer,
assessed damages at $20,000, diminished the award by
one-half for contributory negligence, and entered a net
verdict of $10,000. The court entered judgment on the
verdict. Defendant thereupon moved the court for judgment n.o.v. or in the alternative for a new trial. These
motions were denied.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendant seeks reversal of the judgment and judgment in its favor as a matter of la,v, or that failing, a new
trial.
STATEl\IENT OF FACTS
On January 2, 1960, two ''open joints'' \Yere reported
to the defendant railroad company on its main line near
Green River, Utah (R. 221). [_A_n open joint is a separation between adjoining lengths of rail caused by contraction of the rails sufficient to break the connection between
them. The metal rails expand in warm \veather and contract in cold weather.] Since the existence of an open
joint constitutes a serious hazard to rail traffic, a section cre''T \vas dispatched to each joint to make immediate
repair. The plaintiff, Dennis, \Yas a member of one of
these section crews. He claims damages for the freezing
of two fingers \V hile exposed to the \Yeather during the
repair operations.
Dennis and his fello\v section men, Burnett and Carbjal, and their foreman, Chronopoulos, ""'ere called to work
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about 5:00 o'clock P.M. (R. 94). Efforts were made to
get a fifth man who occasionally worked with the same
crew, but he could not be located (R. 196).
The men left Green River, Utah for the site of the
open joint about 5:30 o'clock P.M. (R. 197). The repair
site was about 18 miles from Green River. The men
traveled by truck until they met the signal maintainer who
was on the track in a motor truck. They then traveled
on the track car about 3;4 mile to the open joint. Upon
arriving, Dennis walked back to the highway to find a
path for the truck and then up the highway to the truck
(R. 136). He then drove the truck down the highway and
over to the open joint (R. 136). Upon arriving at the
repair site with the truck, Dennis and Burnett split
up a tie they had brought in the back of the truck and
built a fire (R. 136). When this fire burned out, the men
built another (R. 148). During the course of the repair
operations the men would come over to the fire to warm
themselves when they got cold. Dennis testified that he
was free to go over to the fire if he got cold and that there
was no one who knew better than he when he was cold
enough to require the warmth of the fire (R. 148, 149).
The weather was cold. There was snow on the ground
and the wind was blowing. The records of the U. S.
Weather Bureau disclosed that at 5 :00 o'clock P.M. on
January 2, 1960, at Green River, Utah it was 10° F. and
that at 5 :00 o'clock A.M. the following morning it was
-5° F. (Exhibit 3-P).
Dennis was not as warmly dressed as the other members of the crew. He was the only one who did not have
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overshoes on (R. 132) and the other members of the crew
were wearing woolen mittens, but Dennis was wearing
canvas gloves (R. 132, 133). He wore a canvas glove next
to the hand and a rubberized glove over that. Each employee furnishes his own clothing and Dennis testified
that he provided himself with what he :figured was sufficient clothing to protect him against the cold (R. 133).
There is no claim that the defendant had a duty to clothe
the plaintiff or to see that the clothing he had was sufficient to protect against the existing weather.
The object of the crew's \Vork in repairing the open
joint was to close the gap between the rails at the joint
in question and to secure the rails together by re-bolting
the angle irons which originally held them in place. This
is done by loosening several rails on both sides of the
open joint and prying the rails toward the joint until it
closes. The joint is then secured by angle irons bolted
to the sides of the rails.
Since the track where the repairs were being made
\vas the main line, it had to be kept open for service during
the repair operations. This is done by placing a small
piece of rail, called a dutchman, in the opening over which
trains can pass at reduced speeds until the joint is closed.
At one point in the trial plaintiff's counsel suggested by
his questions that permanent repairs could a"Tait a more
convenient time so long as a dutchman was placed in the
track. In railroading an open joint is considered an
emergency which must be corrected immediately (R. 229).
The use of a dutchman is strictly a temporary measure
since there are dangers to rail traffic inherent in its use
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( R. 229, 230) and since it seriously slows and impedes
rail traffic ( R. 231). The Green River main line carries
scheduled passenger trains, including the Cailifornia
Zephyr and the Prospector, and also seYeral classified
high-speed freight trains (R. 224-227). Time is a vital
element in railroading because trains run on published
schedules and interchange with other railroad lines.
Traffic on the entire intercontinental line is affected by
delays of each connecting carrier. Delays affect not only
the transportation of passengers but all kinds of merchandise and perishable food and commodities. The railroad
was required to close the open joint as soon as possible.
Dennis intermittently worked on the line and warmed
himself by the fire. He testified that at about midnight he
laid a wrench down by the fire and that ''two fingers were
clamped shut and I had to pull them apart like that before
I could get my glove off'' (R. 108). He said that he remarked, ''it looks like my hand's frozen to that wrench.''
This is the only remark which Dennis claims to have made
about his hand or fingers while he was on the job. Dennis
further testified that he continued to work until about
4 :00 o'clock A.M. and that the men returned to Green
River about 5:00 o'clock A.M. (R. 111). Chronopoulos,
the foreman, testified that at about midnight Dennis complained of the cold and the foreman ''told him I thought
that it would be better for him to get in the cab of the
truck where it was warmer and let the man in the truck
come out and help us" (R. 200). According to the foreman, Dennis went over and got into the truck where
there was a heater going, and he remained there the rest
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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of the night (R. 200). Both of the other laborers also testified that Dennis got into the truck about midnight and
remained there until completion of the job (R. 182, 189).
Dennis admitted that he got into the truck toward the end
of the job but testified that it was after midnight and said
that ''as near as I can remember'' he was not in the truck
"over thirty minutes altogether" (R. 144).
When he got home Dennis noticed a tingling numbness and discoloration in the fingers of his left hand. He
went to a doctor and later his left little finger and middle
finger were surgically removed for frostbite.
At the trial plaintiff called Dr. Reed Clegg, who testified on hypothetical facts that Dennis had suffered from
frostbite. On cross examination, Dr. Clegg testified that
inadequate clothing, and in particular cold feet, would
contribute to lowering of body temperature and thus to
frostbite on vulnerable members of the body (R. 165).
He further testified that adequate clothing can protect
against any weather condition.
At the close of the plaintiff's case the defendant
moved the court for a directed verdict on the ground
that there was no evidence of negligence on the part of the
railroad company and that the undisputed eYidence demonstrated that the cause of plaintiff's frostbite 'Yas his
own failure to properly clothe and protect himself from
the cold. The court denied this motion and subsequently
denied defendant's motions for judgment n.o.v. and new
trial. Defendant contends that the court erred in submitting the case to the jury, in instructing the jury, and
in failing to grant defendant's motions after the trial.
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ARGUl\IENT
POINT I
rr!-IER11~

\\T_.\_S NO EVIDI£XCE OF AN"Y

XF~G

LIGENCE ON THE PART OF THE DEFl~XD_.\KT, AND THE COURT ERRED IX
REFUSING TO GRANrr DEFENDANT'S
l\IOTIO~S FOR DIRECTED VERDICT 1\_~;D
JUDG~lENT N.O.V.
POINT IV
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING
DEFENDANT'S REQUESTS TO INSTRUCT
THE JURY THAT THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE FROl\I WHICH THEY COULD FIND
THAT THE PLAINTIFF WAS NEGLIGENTLY EXPOSED TO THE COLD LONGER
THAN WAS REASONABLY NECESSARY.
POINT V
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING
DEFENDANT'S REQUESTS TO INSTRUCT
THE JURY THAT THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE FROl\I WHICH DEFENDANT
COULD BE FOUND NEGLIGENT IN FAILING TO PROVIDE PLAINTIFF WITH SUFFICIENT HELP.
Points I, IV and V will be considered together under
one heading because they relate to the question of whether
or not there was any evidence of negligence on the part of
the railroad.
It has been stated by the court on many occasions
that Federal Employers Liability Act does not impose
liability without fault. Before the railroad can be found
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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liable, there must be some evidence that the railroad was
negligent. This proposition is well stated in Wilkerson v.
McCarthy, 336 U.S. 53, 69 Sup. Ct. 413, wherein Mr. Justice Frankfurter, speaking for the court said:
''The easy but timid way out for a trial judge is
to leave all cases tried to a jury for jury determination, but in so doing he fails in his duty to take
a case from the jury when the evidence would not
warrant a verdict by it. A timid judge, like a
biased judge, is intrinsically a lawless judge.
These observations are especially pertinent to
suits under the Federal Employers Liability Act.''
The same rule is stated in Brady v. Southern Ry. Co.,
320 U. S. 476, 64 Sup. Ct. 232, wherein Mr. Justice Reed
speaking for a majority of the court said:
''The weight of the evidence under the Employers
Liability Act must be more than a scintilla before
the case may be properly left to the discretion of
the trier of fact - in this case, the jury. (Citing
cases) VVhen the evidence is such that ~thout
weighing the credibility of the witnesses there can
be but one reasonable conclusion as to the verdict, the court should determine the proceeding by
non-suit, directed verdict or other"-ise in accordance \Yith the applicable practice "~ithout submission to the jury, or by judgment notwithstanding
the verdict. By such direction of the trial the result is saYed from the mischance of speculation
over legally unfounded claims. (Citing cases) ...
The rule as to "Then a directed Yerdict is proper,
heretofore referred to, is applicable to questions of
proximate cause (Citing rases) ... Liability ar·ises
from negligence n.ot fro Jn in.iury under th·is Act.
And that negligence must be the cause of the injury (Citing cases)."
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rThe only case involving cold weather exposure which
has gone to the U. S. Supreme Court is Anderson v. Atchison T. & S. F. Ry. Co. (1948), 68 Sup. Ct. 854, 333 U. S.
821. That ease concerned the alleged wrongful death of
a railroad employee who brought suit under the Federal
Employers Liability Act. The complaint alleged that the
decedent was a conductor. While the train was moving
past a station, the decedent fell from the rear vestibule
where he was required to be in the performance of his
duties. This fall resulted in injuries which rendered him
helpless. When the train passed the next station, it was
noted that he had disappeared. Notwithstanding this fact
nothing was done until the train passed three more stations. It was alleged that defendant negligently and carelessly failed to transmit any message of the conductor's
disappearance for an unreasonable length of time and
'vhen the message was finally sent, the defendant negligently and carelessly failed to make a reasonable and
immediate search. After the conductor was found lying
on the ground in a helpless condition, he was taken to a
hospital where he died three days later from exposure to
the very cold weather. The trial court held that even
assuming the allegations of plaintiff's complaint to be
true, it nevertheless did not state facts showing that the
railroad was negligent.
The California Supreme Court sustained the trial
court with two Judges dissenting. The Supreme Court of
the United States reversed holding:
"It thus appears that we have a complaint 'vhich
charges that a conductor disappears from a movSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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ing train in bitter cold weather at a time when
his duty requires him to be on the rear vestibule,
his absence is discovered, and efforts of any kind
to ascertain and save him from his probable peril
are not promptly made by other train employees,
the only persons likely to know of his disappearance and the probable dangers incident to it. \V e
are unable to agree that had petitioner been permitted to introduce all evidence relevant under
her allegations, the facts would have revealed a
situation as to which a jury under appropriate
instructions could not have found that decedent's
exposure and consequent death \Yere due 'in ''Thole
or in part' to failure of respondent's agents to
do \vhat 'a reasonable and prudent man would
ordinarily have done under the circumstances of
the situation.' ''
The Anderson case supra is not analogous to the instant case. The negligence in the Anderson case consisted of failing to take reasonable action after the railroad
knew or should have known of the deceased's disappearance. In the instant case, the negligence complained
of by the plaintiff consists only of requiring the plaintiff,
Mr. Dennis, along with other employees to make emergency repairs during a cold night. It is not contended that
it was negligence for the railroad to make such repairs
during the night in question. Appellant's specific contentions of negligence are contained in the trial court's
instruction No. 2, excerpts of \Yhich are as follows :
1. Requiring the plaintiff unreasonably to work
in unusually severe and cold \Yeather over a
long period of time.
2. Failure to furnish the plaintiff with adequate
\varming facilities.
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3. Failure to provide sufficient help.
A case which is somewhat analogous is Gulf, Colorado & San.ta Fe Ry. Co. v. Waterhouse (1949), 223 S.W.
2d 654. In that case, the plaintiff suffered a heat stroke
while working for the defendant railroad. The plaintiff
introduced evidence relative to certain acts of negligence
'vhich were similar to the acts of negligence claimed by
the plaintiff in the instant case. In addition to these acts

of negligence, he also claimed that the foreman required
him to return to work after he complained to the foreman
that he was getting too hot. The Texas court held that
the jury could properly return a verdict on the ground of
negligence based upon the foreman's insistence that the
plaintiff return to work after the plaintiff had complained
of the heat but stated that the other grounds of negligence
alleged did not constitute negligence against the railroad.
The court said :
''Points 1 to 5, inclusive, are overruled. The findings of the jury established two grounds of negligence, to wit, (Issue 4) in assigning to Plaintiff
such duties as were assigned to him on the afternoon of August 13, 1947, and (Issue 8) in directing
Plaintiff to continue working after he had told his
foreman that he was getting too hot. We hold that
the finding of negligence under Issue 8 and the
relevant finding of proximate cause under Issue 9
were supported by the proof. If the finding under
Issue 4 refers to the act of the foreman in setting
the plaintiff to work cutting brush when the gang
returned to work after eating dinner, as it presumably does, then we hold that it "\Vas not supported by the proof.
:JI:

•

•

•
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[2-4] (2) It was not enough on this record
that Plaintiff was injured by reason of performing
his duties for Defendant. To establish a cause of
action against Defendant under the Federal Employers' Liability Act, Plaintiff had to prove that
Defendant was negligent respecting him and that
this negligence was a legal cause of his injury. The
Act so provides. Title 45 U. S. C. A. ~ 51. The
Supreme Court of the United States has consistently so held, and the requirement of negligence
as a basis of the carrier's liability was not repealed
by the amendment of the 4th section of the Act,
Title 45 U. S. C. A. ~ 54, in 1939, which abolished
the defense of assumption of risk from 'the negligence of any of the officers, agents, or employees of
such carrier.' Eckenrode v. Pennsylvania R. Co.,
335 U. S. 329, 69 S. Ct. 91, 93 L. Ed. ______ ; Wilkerson v. McCarthy, 336 U. S. 53, 69 S. Ct. 413. 93 L.
Ed. ______ ; U rie v. Thompson, Trustee, 337, U. S. 163,
69 S. Ct. 1018, 93 L. Ed. ______ ; Lillie Y. Thompson,
Trustee, 332 U. S. 459, 68 S. Ct. 140, 92 L. Ed. 73 ~
Anderson v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe R. Co.,
333 U. S. 821, 68 S. Ct. 854, 92 L. Ed. 1108; Ellis
v. Union Pacific R. Co., 329 U. S. 649, 67 S. Ct. 598,
600, 91 L. Ed. 572, page 576: 'The Act does not
make the employer the insurer of the safety of his
employees while they are on duty. The basis of his
liability is his negligence, not the fact that injuries
occur.' Lavender v. Kurn, 327 U. S. 645, 66 S. Ct.
740, 90 L. Ed. 916; Tiller v. Atlantic Coast Line R.
Co., 318 U. S. 54, 63 S. Ct. 444, 87 L. Ed. 610, 143
A. L. R. 967 ; Tennessee Central Railroad Company v. Shacklett, 24 Tenn. App. 563, 147 S.W.
2d 1054."
"Thus in Webb's Pollock on Torts it is said: 'a
reasonable man can be guided only by a reasonable
estimate of probabilities. If men went about to
guard themselves against every risk to themselves
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or others 'vhich might by ingenious conjecture be
conceived as possible, human affairs could not be
carried on at all. The reasonable man, then, to
whose ideal behaviour we are to look as the standard of duty, will neither neglect what he can forecast as probable, nor waste his anxiety on events
that are barely possible. He will order his precaution by the measure of what appears likely in the
known course of things.' P. 45. And in the Prosser
on Torts it is said : 'The idea of risk necessarily
involves a recognizable danger, based upon some
knowledge of the existing facts, and some reasonable belief that harm may follow. A risk is a danger which is apparent, or should be apparent, to
one in the position of the actor.' P. 220. Further:
'In the light of the recognizable risk the conduct,
to be negligent, must be unreasonable. Nearly all
acts, of course, carry some remote possibility of
harm to another, and no man so much as rides a
horse without some chance of a runaway. The
risks against which the actor is required to guard
are those which society recognizes as sufficiently
great to demand precaution.' P. 221. Thus here
the Plaintiff's foreman was not negligent in originally ordering Plaintiff to cut brush, or in ordering
him to return to that work after Plaintiff complained to him about his condition, unless he ought
to have known that his orders subjected Plaintiff
to a risk of harm from the prevailing heat which
was unreasonable within the meaning of these
comments.''
In the case before this court, the plaintiff was not
required to remain exposed to the cold any longer than
he chose. There were two fires near the point where the
men were working and the men were free, as indicated by
the evidence, to discontinue their labors at any time and
go to the fires for the purpose of keeping warm. When
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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the plaintiff did complain of being cold, the foreman sent
him into the cab of the truck where there was a heater
and permitted him to operate the truck during the remainder of the shift. It thus appears conclusive that if
the plaintiff was overexposed at any given time, it was of
his own choosing. Certainly the railroad is not required
to advise the plaintiff when he has become ''too cold''
and when he should seek shelter or warmth from the fire.
To do so would require the railroad to act as a guardian
rather than an employer.
The plaintiff did not seriously contend that the defendant negligently failed to furnish adequate warming
facilities. Certainly the plaintiff did not introduce any
evidence indicating what other warming facilities could
reasonably have been provided under the circumstances
and at the time and place where plaintiff was employed.
The only remaining ground of negligence relied upon by
the appellant is that of negligently requiring plaintiff to
work in unusually severe and cold weather over a long
period of time.
The undisputed evidence in this case is that all the
crew available were called out for this particular employment to repair a condition in the track, over which
main line freight and passenger equipment operated.
These men remained at the job longer than a regular
shift. The defendant has not found any cases "~hich hold
that requiring employees to '""ork longer than a regular
shift to repair trackage constitutes negligence. If the
court finds that the evidence in this case is sufficient to
permit a jury to find against a railroad on the grounds
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that the railroad \Yas negligent, it will go further than
any case \vhich we have been able to find and will be contrary to the reasoning of the (Julf, Colorado & Santa Fe
Ry. Co. supra cited herein.
As indicated herein, we have cited the only cases
coming to our attention involving exposure to weather
in Federal Employers Liability cases. There is an annotation in 32 A. L. R. 904 concerning liability of master for
injuries to servant from exposure to weather conditions.
They are not too helpful because the court is concerned
in most of the cases with the doctrine of assumption of
risk \vhich is not applicable in the F. E. L.A. case. On the
issue of negligence the cases do not support a finding of
negligence unless there is some evidence that the employee requested some protection from the weather which
\vas not afforded him. In the instant case, there is no such
evidence.
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ITS INSTRUCTION NO. 2 WHEREBY THE JURY
WAS INSTRUCTED THAT PLAINTIFF'S
OXLY RECOURSE FOR COMPENSATION
FOR HIS INJURIES WAS AGAINST THE
DEFENDANT RAILROAD.
An identical instruction to that given in the Court's
Instruction No. 2 "\vas given in ill oore v. The Den.ver and
Rio Grande Western Railroad Company, 4 Utah 2d 255,
292 P. 2d 849. In that case the court also gave an instrucSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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tion on assumption of risk. The Supreme Court of the
State of Utah in reviewing these two instructions said:
''In some cases, it is conceivable that both or
either of the instructions might be proper and
necessary to dispel improper inferences from
pleadings and evidence. Likewise, in other cases
the prejudice resulting from the giving of such instructions where they were necessary might be
more capable of definition than in the present case
. . . It is unnecessary for us to determine whether,
under the facts of this particular case, the giving
of these instructions constituted reversible error
since the case is reversed on other grounds. The
instructions were improper and should not be
given in the new trial granted under this opinion.''
Following the Moore case supra, it was common for
the district courts to continue giving the two instructions
referred to in the JJ1 oore case, notwithstanding the ruling
in that case. Since the Moore case, plaintff's counsel have
continued to request both of these instructions and
did so in the instant case in plaintiff's requested instruction No. 3. The court refused that part of the requested
instruction concerning assumption of risk but gave the
remainder of the instruction as the court's instruction No.
2. Thus, the jury ,,. .as advised that plaintiff's only recourse for compensation for his injuries was against the
Railroad.
In August, 1961, this Court again considered one of
these immaterial instructions habitually requested by
the plaintiff in Siciliano v. The De_nver and Rio Grande
Western ROJilroad Company, ------ Utah 2d ______ , 364 P. 2d
413. The court held that giving the instruction on asSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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sumption of risk as given in the Moore case supra. was
not only error, it was prejudicial error. The Court said:
''As to the contention that it was prejudicial error
to iustruct the jury as to assumption of risk, we
agree. No issue was raised by defendant's pleading on that score, and there was no evidence that
remotely could have suggested that assuming the
risk would have prevented recovery here. Nor
would have been proper an instruction on assumption of risk had this been a case divorced from the
F. E. L. A. (which specifically eliminates such defense), since the evidence showed conclusively that
Siciliano had no knowledge of any hazard, such
knowledge being a necessary factor before assumption of risk can be urged as a defense.
Mr. Chief Justice Wolfe expressed our disapproval of such an instruction where the issue was
not raised, in Bruner v. McCarthy, but said under
the circumstances, where negligence had been
established as a matter of law, it could hardly
prejudice anyone. In another F. E. L. A. case,
Moore v. D. R. G. W. RR., Mr. Justice McDonough
lent emphasis to such disapproval by saying that
'In the present case, as in the Bruner case, no
issue of assumption of risk was raised by the
pleadings or the evidence and no good purpose
could have been served by the giving of such an
instruction. In some cases, it is conceivable that
(the instruction) might be proper and necessary
to dispel improper inferences from pleadings and
evidence ... It is unnecessary for us to determine
whether under the facts of this case the giving of
the instructions constituted reversible error since
the case is reversed on other grounds. The instructions were improper and should not be given in the
new trial granted under this opinion.' The N ebraska case of Ellis v. Union Pac. RR. emphasizes
such disapproval in even stronger language.''
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Certainly there can be no contention by appellant
that there was any issue in the instant case or any inference drawn which properly raised an issue on the question of compensation.

POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ITS IN"STRUCTION NO. 16 WHICH ADVISED THE
JURY THAT DEFENDANT WAS NEGLIGENT IF IT FAILED TO SELECT THE
PROPER TYPE OF MEN AND CRE\\T TO DO
TI-IE JOB SINCE THERE WAS RO EVIDENCE OR CONTENTION THAT THE DEFENDANT WAS NEGLIGENT IN THAT
PARTICULAR.
In its instruction No. 16, the court instructed the jury
on an entirely immaterial matter. Notwithstanding that
there was not any claim or contention that defendant had
selected an improper type of men or cre\Y to do the job
plaintiff was employed to do at the time he sustained his
alleged injury, the court instructed the jury as follows:
"You are instructed that a railroad is required to
exercise reasonable care in the selection of the size
and type of a ere"'" to do work in the repairing and
maintenance of its tracks.
If you find that this defendant in this case, considering the job to be done and the circumstances
then existing, reasonably failed to select the type
or number of men to do the job, such failure would
be negligence on its part.
Ho,vever, if you find that the defendant Railroad
acted reasonably under all of the circumstances in
the selection of the type and number of men to
make the repair of the open joint, then it cannot
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

19
be eharged with negligence because of the selection
of thl~ crew that \vas used."
There ean be no question that this instruction was
immaterial. Not even appellant will claim that any issue
was made as to the type of men employed. Furthermore,
this immaterial instruction \vas especially prejudicial
considering the racial background of the employees \vho
\vere working on the crew with the plaintiff at the time he
alleged his fingers were frozen. The foreman, J. G. Chronopoulos, is obviously Greek and spoke brokenly. Lee
Carbjol is Spanish-American. Both were called as witnesses by the defendant and both gave testimony contrary
to that given by the plaintiff. For this reason, it was especially prejudicial to invite the jury to consider the immaterial question of \vhether these men were the right type
of employees. This court is aware that some jurors,
whether justified or not, have racial prejudices, and to
invite such jurors to exercise their prejudice is not consistent with the best standards of American justice and
was prejudicial to the rights of this defendant.
The courts have uniformly held that instructions on
an immaterial matter constitute error. Whether or not
the error is prejudicial depends upon the faets and cireumstances. In Ellis v. U. P. R.R., 148 Neb. 515, 27 N.W.
2d 921, the court in commenting on immaterial instructions said:
''In such cases, instructions to the jury should be
considered together that they may be properly understood and when, as an entire charge it appears
they do not limit recoverable negligence to that
charged in plaintiff's petition, but authorize reSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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covery for negligence generally, they will ordinarily be adjudged to be prejudicially erroneous.''
In the instant case, the jury was permitted to find
the railroad negligent on the immaterial issue that the
railroad employed the wrong type of men. We believe
this constituted prejudicial error.
POINT VI
A GROSS AWARD OF $20,000 FOR THE
LOSS OF TWO FINGERS IS SO EXCESSIVE UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES AS
TO COMPEL THE CONCLUSION THAT
THE JURY WAS INFLUENCED BY PASSION AND PREJUDICE IN ASSESSING
DAMAGES, AND THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ERROR IN DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR A NEW
TRIAL.
We submit that a finding of $20,000 for the amputation of two fingers in the instant case, which amputation
did not impair the plaintiff's ability to continue with his
employment except for a short period of time, is grossly
excessive.
CONCLUSION
We submit for the reasons stated herein that the
court should reverse the judgment and direct the court to
enter judgment in favor of the defendant.
Respectfully submitted,
VANCOTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL
& McCARTHY
CLIFFORD L. ASHTON
Counsel for Appella;nt
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